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This paper examines the financial health of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) as of the 
end of March 2001.  We study the financial conditions of FILP recipients, which include public 
corporations and local governments.  We find many are de facto insolvent.  Our estimates suggest as 
much as 75% of the FILP loans are bad.  The expected losses are estimated to be about ¥75 trillion 
(over 15% of GDP).  We also studied the effects of the FILP reform of April 2001, which tries to 
introduce market discipline in allocation of FILP funds.  No significant changes in financial flow are 
detected, yet.  The financial market seems to differentiate the newly introduced FILP agency bonds, 
which are supposed to without government guarantee, from government guaranteed bonds.  It is too 
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The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) in Japan collects funds through government 
financial institutions (most notably postal savings) and uses the funds to finance public projects 
undertaken by government-affiliated corporations or to finance government loans to borrowers in 
targeted areas (targeted industries, small firms, mortgage borrowers, etc).  Many countries have 
government-sponsored loan programs: the Japanese program is distinguished by its size.  At the end 
of fiscal 2000 (March 2001), the FILP program involved ¥418 trillion, equal to some 82% of GDP, 
and the program's uses of funds statement totaled more than GDP.  The postal savings system, the 
most important source of funds for the FILP is the world's largest financial institution. It held ¥250 
trillion in deposits (35% of total household deposits) at the end of fiscal 2000. 
The FILP may promote welfare and economic growth by financing projects that have such 
large externalities that private institutions would not undertake them.  It also may be an impediment 
to welfare and growth by allowing the government to pursue wasteful projects.  Historically the 
program has ignored market information, and its sheer size makes the cost of resource misallocation 
enormous. 
This chapter examines the financial condition of the FILP and analyzes reforms begun in 
April 2001. 
The goal of examining the FILP's financial condition is to see if it constitutes a serious 
impediment to the recovery of the Japanese economy.  FILP's accounts are notoriously opaque.  We 
scrutinize the balance sheets of recipients of FILP funds, including special public corporations 
(SPCs), central government accounts, and local governments. Through this exercise, we can estimate 
the amount of financial losses of the FILP either buried in current balance sheets or expected to 
emerge in the near future. 
The data show that existing losses and expected transfers to cover future losses are enormous. 
These losses are implicit claims on the government (and hence on taxpayers). Together with other 
implicit claims, such as the cost of cleaning up the financial sector (see chapter ¿ by Fukao), FILP 
losses can seriously impede economic recovery. 
Because the FILP is supposed to finance socially useful projects that private institutions are 
unwilling to undertake, it is natural for there to be losses. And, in fact, the central government has 
been transferring funds from its accounts to numerous FILP agencies in the form of explicit subsidies 
and capital contributions.  The losses may be a result of insufficient past subsidies for 
social-welfare-increasing (but high-externality) projects.  However, any argument that stresses the 
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been done until recently – even by the government – to explore the cost-benefit of FILP programs is 
telling. 
Our second purpose is to describe the reform of the FILP introduced in April 2001 and to 
evaluate its likely impact.  The main stated goal of the reform is the introduction of "market 
discipline" in the allocation of funds.  Thus, we examine whether reform can be expected to reduce 
FILP losses in the future. 
The work presented here updates and expands that of a number of researchers (primarily 
available only in Japanese), as outlined in the Appendix on the literature. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  After briefly describing how the FILP is structured and 
its size, we begin our investigation of the financial health of FILP agencies. This involves 
performing a close examination of the balance sheets of the major FILP recipients, correcting for 
various accounting problems. The financial conditions of local governments, which are also 
important borrowers of the FILP, are then taken up. This is a topic not covered extensively by other 
researchers. 
We then discuss the essence of the FILP reform introduced in April 2001, and evaluate the 




The FILP is a government-sponsored program that finances government financial institutions and 
other government-related agencies.  It is not just a system of simple financial intermediation because 
the government and FILP agencies are also linked through flows of direct grants and subsidies.  This 
section presents a brief overview of the structure, size, and history of the FILP. 
 
1.1 Structure and Size 
 
Figure 1 diagrams the structure of the FILP before the 2001 reform, paying particular attention to the 
inter-relations between financial intermediation and fiscal transfers. The magnitude of the sums 
involved is given in Table 1, sources of funds, and Table 2, uses of funds. 
The Trust Fund Bureau (TFB) Fund is by far the most important source, providing some 83% 
of funds as of the end of March 2001.  The majority of the TFB Fund comes from postal savings.  Its 
other major source is pension reserves, which are the difference between the premium receipts and 
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Uses of FILP funds are grouped into seven categories, as shown in Table 2.  Box 1 explains 
the FILP loan to the general account. 
 
Box 1:  FILP Loan to the General Account 
 
The ¥7.3 trillion FILP loan to the general account relate to privatization of the former Japan National 
Railroads (JNR). The JNR started to run deficits in 1964, but was allowed to continue operation and 
to add to its debt.  When JNR was privatized in 1987, ¥25.5 trillion of its debt and some JNR assets 
were transferred to a newly created JNR Settlement Corporation (JNRSC).  The remaining debt was 
assumed by the central government and creditors (including the TFB) received newly issued 
Japanese government bonds. JNRSC was supposed to pay down its debt over 10 years using 
proceeds from sales of the assets it received.  Assets sales stalled and the amount of liabilities 
actually increased.  When the statute establishing JNRSC expired in 1997, the government assumed 
almost all of its ¥28.3 trillion debt.  Thus, the ¥7.3 trillion loan from the FILP should be considered 
a loan to these already-failed corporations. 
 
The first five uses are formally put in the "FILP Plan" every year and submitted to the Diet 
as an attachment to the budget bill. Thus, the size of the FILP Plan (¥418 trillion for the end of March 
2001) is smaller than the total size of the FILP.  This is because the total program includes the TFB's 
holding of government bonds and other financial assets. 
The FILP Plan disburses funds to many local governments, which account for 24% of net 
FILP loans, and 57 other entities. Of the latter, 11 are central government accounts (Postal Savings 
Special Account, 9 other special accounts, and JNR loans) and 46 are "FILP agencies" (8 
government financial institutions, 27 SPCs, and 11 special firms). 
Table 3 summarizes data on the 58 entities that had outstanding FILP loans or 
government-guaranteed bonds (which are held by the public but considered a part of the FILP) at the 
end of March 2001. The total was ¥414 trillion, or ¥357 trillion net of ¥57 trillion loaned back to the 
postal savings system. 
 
1.2 Historical Development 
 
When the FILP started in the 1950s, financing economic recovery was the most important goal.  
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predecessor of the present Development Bank of Japan) and other government financial institutions. 
 When the economy recovered and started to grow rapidly, the focus gradually shifted to housing 
(including mortgage lending) and projects to improve living standards (such as building sewer 
systems).  Providing assistance to small businesses also became an important goal. Financing 
industrial development does not constitute a large area for the FILP Plan any more: only 1% of new 
funds are used for this purpose. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the FILP Plan for fiscal 2001 by 
target areas. 
 
2 Financial Condition of FILP Agencies 
 
In this and the next five sections, we examine the financial condition of the FILP recipients 
other than the local governments, which collectively receive 76% of the total net FILP loans.  The 
financial condition of the local governments is examined in Section 8. 
The first step in analyzing the financial condition of the FILP recipients is to look at the 
self-reported accounting information.  By their own accounts, nine recipients of FILP funds are 
insolvent. That is only a very partial picture, however. The publicly disclosed accounting statements 
of FILP recipients exhibit serious problems, which make it hard to assess their financial conditions. 
To provide a more accurate list of insolvent agencies and estimate the cost to taxpayers of 
the FILP, in each of the next four sections we look at a problem area and make adjustments to 
provide a more accurate assessment. 
The first three areas involve financial losses already accumulated. The losses already made 
come from two principal sources: under-reserving for bad loans and over-valuing assets. In addition, 
other adjustments need to be made to the stated capital (reserves) of many FILP participants.  Our 
analysis of these areas involves examining the balance sheets of FILP participants. 1 
The fourth area is the present value of the cost of covering expected future losses that will 




                                                 
1 Five special accounts and one special firm do not publish balance sheets regularly, so they are excluded from our analysis. 
Fortunately, the ¥4.5 trillion in FILP loans to them amounts to just 1.3% of net FILP loans. The six are noted on Supplemental Table 
1, which is available on our web sites, listed at the end of the references.  Also available on our web sites are the balance sheets and 
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3 Capital (Reserves) 
 
In assessing financial condition, we have paid special attention to the amount of capital (usually 
called reserves in public corporation accounting).  The amount of capital measures how much loss 
the entity can sustain without requiring additional resources from the government. Negative capital 
means de facto insolvency.  Because the government is both a large creditor and the equity holder of 
public corporations, insolvency implies future losses for the government, and hence for taxpayers.  
If the capital is positive but very small, taxpayers are risk for providing more money if even small 
losses occur.  We will see that this is a pervasive problem. 
The amount of capital falls for many corporations when they restate their balance sheets 
based on accounting standards for the private sector. By their own accounts, nine agencies are 
insolvent (have negative capital ratios).  (As an example of how labyrinthine FILP accounting is, a 
tenth agency is insolvent on its original balance sheet but manages to become solvent using private 
sector standards!) 
Data on capital are included in Appendix Table 1 as column 5. Supplemental Table 2 lists 
the amount of capital for each government account and public corporation as reported on its original 
balance sheet (that is, using accounting standards for public corporations) and on its administrative 
cost statement (using standards for private sector firms), as well as the capital ratio. It is available 
on our web sites, listed at the end of the references. 
There is a quite serious accounting problem regarding the largest recipient of FILP funds, 
Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC), and two small special accounts. Their balance 
sheets list cumulative losses on the asset side.  The losses are to be paid off over time by gradually 
reducing capital.  Because the losses have been identified already and are not likely to be eliminated 
(without a corresponding reduction of the capital or infusion of new capital), it is necessary to 
subtract these items from capital immediately to get an unbiased picture of their current financial 
condition. In our analysis, the cumulative losses are subtracted from assets in calculating these 
agencies' capital.  Such losses amount to ¥518.6 billion in total. 
 
 
4 Non-Performing Loans 
 
Disclosed non-performing loans totalled ¥5.6 trillion in March 2001, which is 3.2% of total loans 




 - 7 - 
non-performing loans may be better than before, the small loan-loss reserves of many institutions 
suggest serious under-reserving. Table 5 column 1 summarizes the amount of bad loans disclosed in 
the administrative cost statements. (Supplemental Table 3 has data for each agency. It is available 
on our web sites, listed at the end of the references.) 
Bad loans on the administrative cost statements of government financial institutions are "risk 
management loans," defined in the same way as for private sector banks.  These are loans to failed 
enterprises, loans more than 3 months past due, and restructured loans (that is, have relaxed 
conditions).  Note that loans clearly headed for trouble, but technically still performing, do not need 
to be included. SPCs must disclose only loans that are past due more than 6 months; they hold 6.4% 
of the bad loans in the table. 
In determining under-reserving, we assume 100% of reported bad loans will be lost 
eventually. The 100% loss rate may seem extreme, but the late 1990s experience of private sector 
banks shows this actually is a rather conservative assumption. At the end of March 1996, the first 
time that all banks in the private sector disclosed risk-management loans, the total was ¥28.5 trillion. 
 Disposal of bad loans cost banks ¥34.7 trillion in the following three years.  Despite writing off 
122% of the starting level, total risk-management loans at the end of March 1999 stood at ¥29.6 
trillion, slightly higher than the initial level!  This suggests risk-management loans at the end of 
March 1996 were severely under-reported.  It seems reasonable to expect a similar magnitude of 
under-reporting by SPCs. 
Of the 26 agencies covered, only 5 have reserves equal to or in excess of their bad loans. For 
the 21 agencies that are under-reserved, estimated under-reserving is ¥3.2 trillion. One agency, JFM, 
does not have any loan loss reserves on its balance sheet, but it should (Box 2). Total 
under-reserving including JFM reaches ¥8.3 trillion. Table 5 summarizes loan loss reserves and 
reserves as a percentage of bad loans.   
 
Box 2. Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises 
 
Table 5 and Supplemental Table 3 do not list Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises 
(JFM), which raises fund by issuing government guaranteed bonds and lends to local governments 
and public corporations owned by local governments, because it claims to have no risk management 
loans.  Because we have budget data for local governments, we could estimate JFM 
under-reservation in the same way we estimate expected losses on FILP funds lent to local 
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5 Valuation of Physical Assets 
 
The value of physical assets reported on balance sheets of SPCs may not reflect the true value of the 
assets, primarily because they are not properly depreciated, and also because assets are not 
marked-to-market. 
When book value (original cost) is used for land purchased a long time ago, its actual value 
can be significantly understated.  On the other hand, if a corporation has assets that have lost value 
(such as land purchased in the late 1980s), book value may overstate the true value. 
Improper depreciation of physical assets is a more serious problem and it tends to overstate 
the level of existing assets.  For example, Iwamoto (1998a, p 166) reports that Japan Highway 
Public Corporation is allowed to (and actually does) accumulate reserves for depreciation out of 
profits whenever it feels it is convenient, rather than charging depreciation every year.  Hence the 
assets figures on its balance sheet are gross capital numbers, which include past depreciation.  To 
get net numbers, one has to subtract cumulative reserves (for future redemption of loans) from the 
capital.  Capital calculated in this way still suffers from the problem of under-reporting of 
depreciation, because the corporation charges depreciation only when a sufficient amount of profit 
is realized. 
 
5.1 Revaluing Assets 
 
For 12 corporations that carry large amounts of physical assets on their books, we have revalued 
their assets to reflect market value changes and proper depreciation. All are involved in urban 
development or providing infrastructure. 
Comparing the amounts reported on their original balance sheets to those reported in their 
administrative cost statements, some public corporations adjusted their assets figures substantially 
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agencies, and the level of mis-valuation varies significantly. For the 11 with over-valuations, the 
total is ¥11.4 trillion.2 
 
 
6 Future Losses 
 
In addition to the losses already incurred, some FILP agencies are expected to generate more 
financial losses if they continue to operate.  Carefully estimating the size of such future losses is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  Instead, we rely on the policy cost analysis conducted by each 
FILP agency. 
The analysis, which calculates a present discounted value of estimated government subsidies 
needed to cover the difference between revenues from FILP projects and their costs, started in fiscal 
1999.  That year, the analysis was applied to 5 agencies.  In fiscal 2000, coverage was extended to 
14 agencies, and with fiscal 2001, all 33 agencies that receive new funds from the FILP were 
required to publish a policy cost analysis. Kikkawa et al (2000) have found that the published policy 
cost analyses often seriously over-estimate future revenues, and hence under-estimate the policy cost. 
 Thus, the published data should be taken as a lower bound for expected future losses. 
Projects are expected to generate more revenue than costs at 5 agencies.  For the 28 agencies 
expecting policy costs, the total as of March 2001 is ¥11.7 trillion; for all 33 agencies the projected 
cost is ¥11.4 trillion. (The estimate made by each agency is in Appendix Table 1 column 3.) 
 
 
7 FILP Agency Losses 
  
Table 6 summarizes and totals the financial losses revealed by our analysis in the previous sections. 
At March 2001, for the 34 FILP agencies for which we estimate losses the total was ¥31.0 trillion. 
These losses reduce the agencies' net capital, in some cases giving them negative net capital. 
Our analysis finds 20 FILP agencies that are insolvent (have negative net capital) including 
projected policy costs. Of these, 9 are admittedly insolvent (have negative capital on their 
                                                 
2 Supplemental Appendix A describes the revaluation method in detail and discusses the depreciation rates and land price series used 
for each corporation.  Data are in Supplemental Table 4. These are available on our web sites, listed at the end of the references.  
Two other agencies report significant physical assets, but we are unable to revalue their assets because changes in accounting rules 
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administrative statements), and another 11 are shown to be insolvent after adjustments for the 
accounting problems we have outlined. Data are in Appendix Table 1. 
The 20 insolvent agencies represent more than 60% (¥217 trillion) of net FILP fund loans. 
Not all of the bad loans have been, or will be, truly lost to the FILP. Indeed, because the borrowers 
are all government or quasi-government institutions, we expect all FILP loans to be paid in full 
eventually. Taxpayer money will be used if necessary, as has already happened for the former JNR. 
That means the funds the agencies receive to pay back FILP loans should be considered a cost of the 
FILP, one that will be borne by future taxpayers. 
Thus, a comprehensive approach to the FILP's cost to the public is to estimate what it would 
take to bail-out all FILP agencies. This involves computing the amount of capital originally 
contributed by the government that has already been lost and the cumulative losses that exceed the 
government's original capital. Data for 44 agencies are in Appendix Table 2. 
The government has lost all or part of its capital in 40 agencies, a total of almost ¥12.4 




8 Local Governments 
 
Of ¥357 trillion of net FILP funds outstanding at the end of March 2001, ¥87 trillion (24.4%) were 
loans directly to local governments and public enterprises owned by local governments. These 
entities also borrow from the JFM, which is a large recipient of FILP funds. Thus, the solvency of 
local governments is an important determinant of the financial health of the FILP. 
The amount of FILP loans to local governments each year is determined in a process that is 
led by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (Ministry 
of Home Affairs before the government restructuring in January 2001).  The process requires any 
local government planning a bond issue to obtain Ministry permission in advance.  When permission 
is granted, the Ministry also decides how much of the bonds will be bought by the TFB Fund and 
Postal Life Insurance Fund. 
There is no mechanism ensuring FILP loans go only to financially healthy entities.  Indeed, 
loans are routinely used by the Ministry to distribute funds to financially troubled local governments 
and may even be skewed toward such governments. Doi (2002) found that a local government that 
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"local-allocation tax grants" (lump-sum grants distributed by the central government to make up for 
shortages in local tax revenues.) 
Thus, one would suspect that many local governments with high debts are servicing the debts 
using funds provided by the central government.  If this is the case, we would find a substantial 
amount of non-performing FILP loans to local governments. 
Local governments are not required to prepare balance sheets, which prevents us from 
applying the approach used for FILP agencies.  So, in this section, we focus on the ability for a local 
government to pay off its current outstanding bonds. 
 
8.1 Local Government Solvency and Losses 
 
For each local government, we calculate debt capacity defined as the present discounted value of 
future expected primary surpluses (revenues minus non-interest expenditures).  If the current local 
government debt exceeds the calculated debt capacity, we conclude the local government is de facto 
insolvent. 
Budget data for fiscal 1997 through 2000 are used.  A lack of budget data prevents including 
public enterprises owned by local governments.  Thus, the estimates reported are a lower bound for 
the losses expected in FILP loans to local governments and local public enterprises. 
We start by estimating future primary surpluses for each local government, using six different 
scenarios. 
 
8.1.1 Estimating Procedure 
 
Letting Si denote the expected primary surplus for the local government i, we can calculate the debt 










B ii  (1) 
 
where r is the constant discount rate, assumed to be 4%. 
Note that we assume debt capacity cannot be below zero.  Thus, if a local government runs 
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By comparing Bi* to the outstanding debt as of the end of March 2001, denoted by Bi,2001, we 
can calculate the amount of debt that is not likely to be paid off.  Let us define DFi,2000 as: 
 
{ }0,max *2001,2001, iii BBDF -=  (2) 
 
If DFi,2000 is strictly positive, we say the local government is de facto insolvent and the size of 
DFi,2000 shows the magnitude of insolvency. The result, of course, depends critically on the 
estimated level of Si. 
 
8.1.2 The Scenarios 
 
In the baseline case (Scenario 1), we assume this is constant and equal to the simple average of the 
primary surpluses in fiscal 1997-2000.  
Because we estimate the future primary surplus from data for four years when the economy 
was stagnating (April 1997 through March 2001), it might be lower than the long-run level after the 
economy recovers.  To address this, we consider Scenario 2, which assumes general revenue (tax 
revenue, local transfer taxes, and local-allocation tax) jumps 20% in the first year and stays there. 
Another assumption in the baseline case is that the future primary surplus does not grow.  
Scenario 3 considers an alternative where the surplus grows 2% each year. 
In the first three scenarios, we assume the local governments can continue to rely on 
local-allocation tax grants from the central government.  That system, however, is likely to change in 
the near future.  Its overhaul is an important part of the fiscal decentralization that the government has 
been deliberating since the mid 1990s. 
A Decentralization Promotion Committee was created within the Prime Minister's Office in 
1995, and started drafting a decentralization plan.  The committee published its final report in June 
2001. On the issue of local-allocation tax grants, the committee argues that there should be a transfer 
of tax bases from the central government to local governments to improve the fiscal condition of 
local governments and that the local-allocation tax grants should be reduced so that the transfer of tax 
bases is neutral to the total tax revenue of the central and local governments (see Decentralization 
Promotion Committee 2001, ch 3 §1). 
In Scenarios 4, 5, and 6, we consider the case where the tax base for local-allocation tax 
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tax revenues, and local-allocation tax grants become zero.  Scenario 4 assumes the expected future 
primary surplus is given by the average for fiscal 1997-2000.  Scenario 5 assumes general tax 
revenue increases 20% in the first year and then stays constant.  Scenario 6 assumes the future 




Table 7 summarizes the results of our calculation.  At the end of fiscal 2000, total debts outstanding 
for 47 prefectures, 693 cities (and wards in Tokyo), and 2,557 towns and villages amounted to 
¥125.5 trillion, of which ¥55.0 trillion was owed to the FILP fund and ¥8.2 trillion was owed to the 
JFM (Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises). These are amounts in the Ordinary 
Accounts of local governments, and do not include debts in Enterprise Accounts and of public 
corporations owned by the local governments. 
If the current system of local-allocation tax grants continues and if the primary surpluses of 
local governments do not improve (Scenario 1, the baseline case), the current level of local debts is 
estimated to exceed the debt capacity for all 47 prefectures, 326 out of 693 cities, and 1,240 of 2,557 
towns and villages. The total size of the insolvency is ¥89.5 trillion. In other words, these entities 
have borrowed almost ¥90 trillion more than we expect them to be able to repay based on their 
current tax and spending patterns.  Assuming that the insolvency is addressed by defaulting on the 
loans (rather than raising taxes or cutting spending) and that FILP loans and JFM loans have the same 
seniority as other debts, 64% (¥35.2 trillion) of the outstanding FILP loans to local governments and 
62% (¥5.1 trillion) of the outstanding JFM loans to local governments will be defaulted. 
When we assume the system of local-allocation tax grants is decentralized (Scenario 4), debt 
capacity improves for some prefectures and cities, while the capacity of many towns and villages 
declines.  This is because the current allocation of tax grants is skewed in favor of financially poor 
local governments, which include many towns and villages.   
Scenarios 2 and 5, which assume an economic recovery that increases general revenue 20%, 
of course produce much smaller losses. Comparing Scenarios 2 and 5 suggests that the increased 
debt capacity of local governments in Scenario 2 mostly results from increased local-allocation tax 
grants at local governments already receiving disproportionately large allocations. When the system 
of grants is decentralized (Scenario 5), these governments lose the extra large allocations.  The 
result suggests that many such local governments would not be able to meet the debt payments 
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Scenarios 3 and 6, which have 2% annual growth in the primary surplus, see enhanced debt 
capacities of some local governments, but the expected amount of insolvency are not much different 
from the baselines (Scenarios 1 and 4). 
 
 
9 Overall Cost to Taxpayers 
 
Table 8 summarizes total bad loans. Of the ¥357 trillion of net FILP funds, 75% (¥267 trillion) can 
be considered bad loans. 
Our estimate of the total cost to taxpayers to bail-out and recapitalize public corporations, 
cover local-government defaults, and retire former Japan Rail-related debt is ¥78.3 trillion, which 




10 "Fundamental Reform" 
 
A government study in the late 1990s found three shortcomings in the FILP that have motivated 
change (FILP Report 2000, p 24).  First, the TFB, which handled all the deposits from postal savings 
and pension reserves, may have become too big to be efficient.  Second, too much consideration for 
TFB depositors (that is, the pension funds and postal savings) may have been keeping the cost of 
FILP funds too high.  Third, the opaque nature of the FILP's subsidy component may have been hiding 
substantial future burdens on taxpayers. 
To address these issues, effective 1 April 2001 the FILP went through a "fundamental 
reform."  Figure 3 shows how the FILP system will look when the "transition" is complete. 
The TFB has been abolished.  Its personnel and assets have been inherited by the Fiscal Loan 
Fund (FLF).  Postal savings and pension reserves are not automatically deposited into the FLF. 
Instead, the funds are invested in the financial market at the discretion of the postal savings and 
pension systems, as was the case already for a small share of the funds. 
How FILP agencies raise their funds also has changed.  Under the new FILP, the agencies 
raise funds in three ways.  The preferred way is for an agency to issue its own bonds in the financial 
market.  The Framework of the Fundamental Reform declares that each agency should "make utmost 
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bonds in the open market will be allowed to issue bonds with a government guarantee.  Finally, 
agencies can tap funds raised collectively through the issuance of FILP bonds by the FLF. 
 
10.1 Intended Results of the Reform 
 
Use of FILP agency bonds rather than TFB funds can potentially eliminate the problem of fund costs, 
if some FILP agencies can issue bonds at lower yields than they have been paying the TFB for funds. 
Non-transparency is addressed by requiring further disclosure of FILP agencies and the FILP 
system as a whole.  Two specific measures have been implemented. 
First, starting with fiscal 1999, the government began calculating the "policy cost" for each 
FILP agency and publishing the result.  Policy cost is defined as the present discounted value of the 
stream of net transfers from the government to an agency.  This measure reveals the expected cost to 
the government (thus, taxpayers) to sustaining operation of an agency. 
Second, in June 2001, the Fiscal System Council of the Ministry of Finance came up with a 
recommendation on accounting disclosures for SPCs. As a result, all SPCs (many of which are FILP 
agencies) were required to publish "administrative cost statements" for fiscal 2000 by the end of 
September 2001. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
10.2 Administrative Cost Statements 
 
SPCs are required to publish balance sheets and income statements using the accounting standards 
of private sector firms beginning with the fiscal 2000 (which ended March 2001). The opportunity 
cost of government funds used as capital for the agency also is calculated. Adding that to the loss 
shown on the income statement yields the "administrative cost statement" (gyosei cost keisansho). 
(The importance of including the opportunity cost of government funds was first pointed out by 
Fukao 1998.) 
The statements are supposed to be free from the accounting problems identified in earlier 
sections.  For example, the Fiscal System Council's guideline requires SPCs to adjust depreciable 
assets for depreciation.  They also require government financial institutions (but not SPCs) to 
disclose non-performing loans using the same criteria as private sector financial institutions. 
Although the reform was launched on 1 April 2001, implementation is planned to be gradual 
and many "transitional measures" are provided.  For example, postal savings and the pension 




 - 16 - 
develops.  Moreover, the postal savings and the postal life insurance fund plan to buy bonds directly 
from local governments, because most local governments would have trouble floating bonds in the 
market.  Thus, the "discretion" that the postal savings and other funds are supposed to enjoy is 
seriously limited during the "transition" period. 
 
10.3 Actual Substantive Change is Not Assured 
 
A comparison of the old and new systems reveals the possibility that, the government's claim that the 
reform is "fundamental" notwithstanding, the new system may in practice not differ substantially 
from the old after all.  It is possible for the new system to replicate the financial flows of the old 
system even after the "transitional measures" expire.  For example, postal savings may continue to 
buy FILP bonds, and FILP agencies may continue to borrow from the FLF.  Then, although the name 
of the intermediary is different, the flow of funds would be exactly the same as under the old system. 
Moreover, local governments will not be required to issue bonds in the financial market and can 
continue to depend on the FLF.3 
The introduction of FILP agency bonds, which are supposed to be without government 
guarantees, may not change the situation much, either.  The market may continue to believe FILP 
agency bonds are implicitly guaranteed by the government. Wallison (2001) makes an interesting 
comparison between FILP agency bonds and bonds issued by government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), such as Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in the United States.  He 
points out that even though US legislation explicitly states that Fannie Mae securities are not 
government guaranteed, yields on its securities are only slightly higher than on US Treasury bonds. 
 Thus, he is skeptical of the idea of market discipline from FILP agency bonds. 
 
 
11 Effects of Reform 
 
Reform does not change losses that the FILP has already sustained, but it may prevent FILP agencies 
from accumulating further losses.  After the reform, public corporations are supposed to raise funds 
                                                 
3 Several local governments – including Tokyo Metropolitan and Osaka City – were issuing bonds in the financial market before the 
reform.  The amount of outstanding local bonds so issued is, however, a little less than 10% of total local bonds outstanding. In the 
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from the financial market.  The postal savings and pension reserve funds, which used to fund them 
automatically through the TFB now can invest in the financial market, without necessarily buying the 
FILP bonds or FILP agency bonds. 
The changes are intended to expose public corporations to market monitoring.  A 
loss-accumulating corporation may have difficulty raising funds and may be forced to restructure its 
operation.  Or, the central government may be forced to subsidize a corporation explicitly so that it 
can continue its loss-making but socially beneficial activities. 
Writing 14 months from the start of the reform, we can examine some early data to see 
whether the reform looks promising.  
First, we look at how uses of postal savings funds and the sources of funds used by FILP 
agencies have changed.  Second, we study the secondary market pricing of the limited number of 
FILP agency bonds being traded. 
 
11.1 Flow of Funds 
 
Financial flows in the FILP need to change substantially to make FILP agencies subject to the market 
discipline.  However, the reform may not necessarily change the flow of funds: if the postal savings 
system chooses to buy FILP agency bonds, FILP bonds, and local government bonds, flows in the 
reformed FILP will replicate those of the old FILP. 
Table 10 shows planned uses of postal savings funds for the first two years after the FILP 
reform (fiscal 2001 and 2002).  There are no substantial changes: the majority of available funds are 
to be invested in the FILP and most of the rest is to be invested much as it was by the TFB. The 
optimistic interpretation is that the allocation of postal savings so far has been heavily constrained 
by transitional measures that require postal savings to absorb a substantial amount of FILP bonds. 
The sources of funds for FILP agencies also show little change.  Table 11 gives the amount 
of the FILP loans to public corporations in the FILP plans for fiscal 2001 and 2002 and compares 
those to the size of FILP agency bond issues.  The introduction of FILP agency bonds is perhaps the 
most important aspect of the reform, but they have not become a major source of funds.  Although for 
fiscal 2002 the ratio of bonds to loans is planned to slightly exceed 14%, it will take a long time for 
the total outstanding amount of bonds to approach the level of loans. 
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A key question is whether the market sees these bonds as having implicit government guarantees.  If 
it does, market discipline will be absent, as there is no incentive to monitor and evaluate the 





Table 12 shows the bond ratings for FILP agencies granted by major rating agencies. Tokyo-based 
R&I (Rating & Investment Information Inc) has the most extensive coverage of the three major rating 
agencies, assessing bonds issued by 15 FILP agencies.  The Japanese branches of Moody's and 
Standard & Poors rate far fewer, and add only 2. Thus, 17 FILP agencies are rated by at least one 
rating agency. 
R&I seems to distinguish among FILP agencies, and this suggests it does not see all the bonds 
as government guaranteed.  Three government financial institutions are rated as high as Japanese 
government bonds (JGBs) were in May 2002.  Most of the 14 others were one notch below.  
Moody's and S&P rank the same 3 agencies on par with JGBs as R&I does. The numbers of FILP 
agencies that Moody’s and S&P rate are so small that it is hard to judge if they are carefully 
distinguishing between FILP agency bonds issued by different agencies. 
 
12.2 Spreads 
By comparing yields on FILP agency bonds to those on JGBs or government-guaranteed bonds (also 
issued by public corporations), we can see if the market views FILP agency bonds as implicitly 
guaranteed. As of May 2002, 28 bonds issued by 17 FILP agencies have sufficient secondary-market 
data. 
Figure 4 plots the yields of FILP agency bonds and JGBs against maturities.  Agency bonds 
all are above the yield curve of JGBs, with the premium exceeding 80 basis points for some issues. 
 Thus, the market seems to view FILP agency bonds as significantly more risky than JGBs. 
Figure 5 compares FILP agency bonds to government-guaranteed bonds (many issued by the 
agencies). The market clearly distinguishes FILP agency bonds from government-guaranteed bonds 
issued by the same agencies. 
Looking at the yield spreads between the 28 bonds and comparable JGBs shows substantial 
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Bank of Japan, which are healthier than the other agencies in our analysis and are rated the same as 
JGBs by all three rating agencies, have been relatively small (11 to 14 basis points).  Agencies with 
high estimated financial losses, tend to have high spreads (68 to 82 basis points).  At 30 May 2002, 
Urban Development Corp, lowest-rated of the agencies reviewed by R&I and de facto insolvent 
based on our accounting, had a spread of 77.7 basis points.  The widest spread was 81.8 basis points 
for an unrated issue of Japan Regional Development Corp, although it is solvent even after 
accounting adjustments.4 
The gap between low-spread agencies and high spread agencies seems to have widened 
after April 2002.  This may suggest that the financial market for FILP agency bond is getting better 
at discriminating between bonds issued by different agencies. 
Although the FILP reform talked about using FILP agency bonds as a device to apply market 
discipline on public corporations, it is not clear how that will work in the extreme. There is no 
transparent mechanism to deal with failures of public corporations and defaults of FILP agency 
bonds. Indeed, there is no legal procedure for closing a poorly performing public corporation. 
Thus, although our review suggests an emergence of market signals on the quality of specific 





This chapter has examined the financial cost that the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program has 
imposed on taxpayers by studying the financial condition of recipients of FILP loans: mainly public 
corporations and local governments.  Many FILP recipients are de facto insolvent.  Of the ¥357 
trillion of the net FILP funds, about ¥267 trillion is loaned to insolvent recipients. The cost to 
taxpayers to clean up the expected FILP loss is estimated to be at least ¥75 trillion, over 15% of 
2001 GDP. 
Together with the massive cost of cleaning up the financial sector (chapter ¿ by Fukao) and 
the increasing burden of the social security system (chapter ¿ by Dekle), the losses in the FILP 
constitute a serious impediment to recovery of the Japanese economy.  To the extent that funds have 
been misallocated to projects with low returns or that losses have resulted from inefficient use of 
                                                 
4 Supplemental Table 5 provides data on the spreads of each issue. It is available on our web sites, listed at the end of the references. 
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funds, this chapter provides evidence that the FILP has hurt economic growth, at least since the late 
1990s. 
Regarding the FILP reforms introduced in April 2001, we found the pattern of financial 
flows in the FILP has hardly changed.  Some good news is that the financial market distinguishes 
FILP agency bonds from government-guaranteed bonds, which is essential if the use of FILP agency 
bonds is to introduce market discipline on their issuers. It is too early to tell, however, whether the 
bonds will be an effective disciplinary device. 
 
13.1 Other Issues 
 
There are four major issues about the FILP and its future that this chapter did not examine thoroughly. 
 These are left for future research. 
First, nothing is said about the welfare aspects of the FILP.  If foregone opportunities from 
resource misallocation are taken into account, the welfare cost of the FILP might turn out to be even 
larger than our estimate of financial losses suggests.  On the other hand, some loss-making agencies 
may be providing welfare-enhancing services that offset the financial losses.  Examining welfare 
aspects of the FILP is an important future research topic. 
Second, we relied on estimates of "policy cost" published by each FILP agency. As Kikkawa 
et al (2000) show, for several FILP agencies, this most likely understates the true magnitude of the 
cost.  Studies to improve the estimates of future losses are needed. 
Third, empirical analysis of the new FILP is limited by the amount of data, because the new 
regime started just 14 months ago.  It is important to continue monitoring changes in the pattern of 
financial flows and development of the market for FILP agency bonds. 
Finally, the lack of a clear mechanism to close down poorly performing public corporations 
is an important shortcoming of the 2001 FILP reform.  Such a mechanism is a necessary condition for 
disciplining through FILP agency bonds.  Absent a strong government commitment not to bail out 
public corporations, and a credible mechanism to prevent bail-outs, market discipline will not 
develop (see Iwamoto 1998b). 
Such a mechanism is also necessary to deal with the losses that have already been incurred 
by the FILP.  It is important to recognize the losses as soon as possible and to decide on the 
loss-sharing mechanism.  Without a clear loss-sharing mechanism, negotiations between 
stakeholders will lead to delay.  Delay increases the losses.  Serious research on efficient closure 
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Appendix: Literature Review 
 
Good descriptions of the FILP and the postal savings system in English are Cargill and Yoshino 
(2000, 2001).  Bayoumi (1998) is a nice introduction to the FILP and the Japanese fiscal system 
in general. 
FILP Report, an annual publication available on the Ministry of Finance's web site 
(www.mof.go.jp/english), is an official guide to the FILP.  The description is often 
self-congratulatory, but it provides basic information. 
Kikkawa, Sakai, and Miyagawa (2000) examines the financial health of selected FILP 
agencies.  Their study focuses on the future expected cash flows of the agencies.  They estimate 
the present value of the future losses (negative cash flows) of FILP agencies to be much higher 
than the estimates published by the MOF.  In this chapter, we do not estimate future cash flows 
for each agency.  Instead, we use the MOF estimates.  The results in Kikkawa suggest that our 
estimates of total losses are most likely the lower bound of the true amount. 
Wallison (2001) discusses the FILP reform of 2001 and argues that the attempt to rely on 
the market to discipline FILP agencies without privatizing them is likely to fail. Iwamoto (2002) 
argues that the reform has failed to force the government to re-evaluate the role of SPCs and to 
close down the ones that have ceased to be useful. 
In Japanese, a comprehensive survey of the huge body of research is provided by 
Iwamoto (2001). Most of it examines government financial institutions in the FILP, such as the 
Japan Development Bank and the Government Housing Loan Corporation. 
Matsuura (1990), Kono (1993), and Fukao (1998) are among several papers that seek to 
provide a comprehensive picture on how the FILP works.  They carefully disentangle the 
complex flow of funds and subsidies among the central government, public corporations, and 
local governments in the FILP. 
The work most closely related to this essay are Iwata (1998a) and Doi and Mori (2002). 
 Iwata finds serious under-capitalization, a substantial amount of bad loans, and significant 
under-reporting of depreciation for selected FILP agencies.  Doi and Mori find similar problems 
for a wider set of FILP agencies.  This essay complements their analyses by using more recent 
data.  Most importantly, we use the financial statements of public corporations based on 
private-sector accounting standards, which were first published 2001.  The problems Iwata, and 
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Yoshida and Konishi (1996) was the first comprehensive analysis of the financial 
condition of the FILP agencies.  Perhaps hindered by incomplete disclosure and improper 
accounting, they failed to recognize the serious financial problem hidden in the FILP.  It is also 
possible that the magnitude of the problem was smaller then.  In any case, using more recent data, 
we find much a larger problem than they did. 
Higo (2001) provides a very useful description of the FILP reform of April 2001.   
Noguchi and Sasaki (1999) examined yield spreads between government-guaranteeed 
bonds and a few non-government-guaranteed bonds issued by FILP agencies before the 2001 
FILP reform. They found the spreads were at most 15 basis points, suggesting the financial 
markets considered the bonds implicitly government-guaranteed. We find more substantial 
spreads between FILP agency bonds and government-guaranteed bonds since the FILP reform. 
We go beyond a descriptive analysis of the reform and try to examine its impact 
empirically.  This chapter also examines the financial health of local governments, something the 
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Table 1 
 
Sources of FILP Funds, March 2001 
 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
 
Line Amount Share Source 
 
— 439,663 83.1 Trust Fund Bureau Fund 
4 61,658 11.6 Postal Life Insurance Fund 
5 3,383 0.6 Industrial Investment Special Account 
6 24,579 4.6 Government-guaranteed Bonds 
 
 529,283 100 Total 
 
Components of the Trust Fund Bureau (TFB) Fund 
 
 Amount Share Share 
  of total within TFB 
 
1 247,008 46.7 56.7 Postal Savings 
2 142,593 26.9 32.4 Pension Reserves 
3 50,062 9.5 11.4 Others1 
 
 
Line numbers refer to Figure 1. 
1 Includes postal life insurance premiums collected during the fiscal year (which are 
deposited into the TFB) and short-term deposits by some special accounts, as well as profits and 
reserves at the TFB. 
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Table 2 
 
Uses of FILP Funds, March 2001 
 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
 
Line Amount Share Use 
 
10 7,279 1.4 General account (JNR loans)1 
11 57,350 10.8 Postal Savings Special Account2 
12 6,298 1.2 Other special accounts 
13 259,617 49.0 FILP agencies3 
14 87,270 16.5 Local government 
 
– 417,814 78.9 FILP Plan total 
 
15 72,682 13.7 Central government bonds4 
– 38,787 7.3 Other5 
 
 529,283 100 Total uses 
 
 471,993 – Total excluding Postal Savings SA 
 
Line numbers refer to Figure 1. 
1 TFB loans to the former Japan National Railroad (JNR) and former JNR Settlement Corp 
(JNRSC), which the government assumed (see Box 1). Unlike other loans to the general account, 
these are included in the formal FILP Plan. 
2 Funds the TFB has loaned back to the postal savings system for it to invest directly. These 
are excluded from the net total. 
3 Includes ¥3,352 in contributed capital and ¥256,265 in loans. 
4 Including JNR loans (note 1) the central government total is ¥79,961 billion. 
5 Includes short-term loans (mainly to the Special Account for Grants of Allocation Tax and 
Transfer Taxes [to local governments]) and certain financial investments with a maturity of less 
than 5 years. 
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Table 3 
 





# of recipients1 Amount Originating lending source 
 
 47 270,844 Trust Fund Bureau2 
 32 61,658 Postal Life Insurance 
 3 31 Industrial Investment SA 
 
 51 332,533 Net total FILP loans2 
 
 24 24,579 Government-guaranteed bonds 
 
 57 357,112 Total 
 
 1 57,350 Postal Savings SA loans 
 
 58 414,462 Total FILP funds3 
 
 
1 Number of recipients, counting local governments (which have TFB and PLI loans) as 1. 
Not counting local governments and the Postal Savings SA (note 2), there are 50 recipients of 
FILP loans and an additional 6 have bond guarantees but no loans. 
2 Excludes funds the TFB has loaned back to the postal savings system for it to invest directly. 
With them, loans from the TFB total ¥328,194 and total loans are ¥389,883. 
3 Adding ¥3,352 in capital contributions to this yields the ¥417,814 FILP Plan total in Table 
2. 
 
Source: This table is the column totals of Supplemental Table 1, which provides data (from FILP 
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Table 4 
 





 29.9 Housing 
 19.9 Living environment 
 16.1 Small and medium businesses 
 11.2 Road construction 
 4.8 Trade and economic cooperation 
 3.9 Social welfare 
 3.4 Regional development 
 2.8 Education 
 2.4 Agriculture1 
 2.3 National land preservation2 
 2.3 Transport and communication 
 1.0 Industry and technology 
 
The FILP plan total for the year was ¥32.5 trillion. 
 
1 Includes forestry and fisheries. 
2 Includes reconstruction in the event of disaster. 
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Table 5 
 
Disclosed Bad Loans of FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001 
 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
 
 Bad Loans: Loan Loss Reserve: 
 yen1 % of in as % of Name or type of agency and 
  all loans2 yen bad loans3 number of agencies4 
 
 1398 1.8 41 2.9 Government Housing Loan Corp 
 3148 5.0 1629 51.8 Other gov't financial institutions (6) 
 519 2.3 354 41.6 SPCs (18) 
 534 4.9 465 87.0 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 
 5599 3.2 2489 44.5 Total for all agencies 
 
 5441 3.2 2262 41.6 Total for under-reserved agencies (21) 
 
 
The absolute amount of under-reserving for each agency is included in Appendix Table 1.  Total 
under-reserving (the difference between bad loans in column 1 and reserves in column 3) is 
¥3179 for under-reserved agencies. Including JFM (see Box 2), the total is ¥8251. 
1 For government financial institutions and Shoko Chukin Bank, entries are for 
risk-management loans.  SPCs are allowed to use a less strict definition. For them, the figures 
show amounts of loans past-due 6 months or more or loans to bankrupt entities that they report 
with their balance sheets. 
2 Bad loans as a percentage of total loans made. 
3 An entry under 100% means the agency is under-reserved. 
4 Only agencies that disclose non-performing loans are included. 
 
Source: Summarized from Supplemental Table 3, which provides data specific to each agency. 
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Table 6 
 





 Number of Amount 
agencies with of 
each type of loss loss Source of loss 
 
 22 8,251 Under-reserving of bad loans 
 11 11,357 Over-valuing of assets 
 28 11,657 Policy costs 
 3 -228 Policy gains offsetting other losses 
 
 34 31,037 Total 
 
 
Source: Appendix Table 1, which gives data by agency. 
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Table 7 
 




 Source of Funds: Borrower, by type: 
 JFM1 FILP Total2 Prefect- Cities & Towns & 
    ures wards villages 
 
 - - - 47 693 2557 Number 
 8,246.4 54,999.5 - - - - Total loaned 
 - - 124,760.7 72,326.3 41,831.4 10,603.0 Total debt2 
 
Loans to Insolvent Entities3     Scenario 
 
 6,160.4 a42,331.1 105,775.5 69,546.4 29,767.3 6,461.8 1 
 1,443.6 10,964.1 30,150.5 25,622.9 3,665.3 862.2 2 
 5,207.6 36,199.1 94,659.8 66,656.9 23,244.4 4,758.5 3 
 5,803.0 39,553.1 85,463.4 52,475.8 22,737.7 10,249.9 4 
 4,389.8 31,785.9 64,891.2 46,115.2 9,135.7 9,640.2 5 




 5,072.5 b35,201.8 89,517.4 61,862.5 22,633.4 5,021.5 1 
 462.7 3,494.4 9,374.4 5,943.1 2,929.2 502.1 2 
 4,397.3 30,317.1 76,342.5 53,983.2 18,316.4 4,042.8 3 
 5,679.1 38,925.9 84,282.2 52,475.8 21,558.1 10,248.2 4 
 4,263.1 31,178.8 63,617.2 46,089.4 7,931.4 9,596.3 5 
 5,582.8 38,384.2 83,118.6 52,475.8 20,472.1 10,170.7 6 
 
 
The scenarios are explained in the text. The analysis excludes local public enterprises because of a 
lack of data. These enterprises have losses, so the estimates here are lower bounds. 
1 JFM is the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises. 
2 Total debt outstanding, defined as "local bonds" plus "contract-authorized liabilities" minus 
"reserve" minus "net excess of revenue" at the end of fiscal 2000. 
3 Sum of the debts of insolvent local governments, where insolvency is defined as debts 
exceeding debt capacity. Debt capacity is the present discounted value of the expected level of 
primary surplus, as explained in the text.  A 4% discount rate is assumed. 
4 Sum of the differences between total debts and debt capacities under each scenario.  The 
seniority of FILP and JFM loans are assumed to be the same as other liabilities.  
a Value for Loans to Insolvent Entities used in Table 8. 
b Value for Expected Default used in Table 9. 
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Table 8 
 






 7.3 JNR-related debt (Box 1) 
 217.0 Insolvent agencies1 
 42.3 Insolvent local governments (Table 7) 
 
 266.6 Total 
 
 
1 Insolvent agencies (that is, agencies with negative net capital) are listed in Appendix Table 
1. Their debt is included with their entries in Supplemental Table 1, which is available on our 
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Table 9 
 





 Amount Source 
 
 7.3 JNR-related debt (Box 1) 
 35.8 Cost to restore capital of FILP agencies 
  (Appendix Table 2), composed of: 
  12.4 Lost original capital 
  23.5 Cumlative operating losses in excess of original capital 
 35.2 Expected default of local government debt (Table 7) 
 
 78.3 Total 
 
 
Note: The cost to restore capital of FILP agencies (¥35.8 trillion) in this table differs from the 
total financial losses reported in Table 6 (¥31.0 trillion) because the figure in this table includes 
the losses that are already reported on the agencies’ original balance sheets even before we 
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Table 10 
 
Sources and Uses of New Postal Savings Funds 
 
(in billion yen) 
 
 2001a 2002b 
 
   Sources of Funds: 
 32,297 23,723 Matured TFB deposits 
 8,223 15,393 Other1 
-16,019 -3,848 Reduction in deposits2 
 
 24,501 35,267 Total 
 
   Uses of Funds: 
 15,800 13,600 FILP bonds 
 1,200 7,950 Other JGB3 
 450 450 Public corporation bonds 
 550 550 Local government bonds 
 1,000 980 Local government loans 
 934 713 Loans to depositors 
 400 400 Corporate bonds 
 50 50 Foreign bonds 
 750 2,350 Money trust4 
 3,367 8,224 Short-term securities 
 
 
1 Income from the investments made by postal savings on its own account. 
2 Expected net withdrawls by depositors in the postal savings system. 
3 Japanese government bonds. 
4 This relates to the Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp. 
 
a Fiscal year ending 2002 March 31. 
b Fiscal year ending 2003 March 31. 
 
Source: www.yusei.go.jp/pressrelease/japanese/kawase/001224j301.html. Posted 24 Dec 
2000, in Japanese. Heisei 13 / Heisei 14 nendo ni okeru Yubin Chokin Shikin Unyo Keikaku 
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Table 11 
 
Use of FILP Agency Bonds 
 
(in billion yen and percent) 
 
 2001a 2002b 
 
 22,759 1,749 New FILP loans1 
 1,006 2,487 New issues of FILP agency bonds 
 4.4% 14.3% Agency bonds as % of loans 
 
 
1 Does not includes loans to the central government or to local governments. 
a Fiscal year ending 2002 March 31. 
b Fiscal year ending 2003 March 31. 
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Table 12 
 
Ratings of FILP Agency Bonds (May 2002) 
 
 
S&P Moody R&I Agency 
 
AA- Aa1 AAA Japanese government bonds (JGB) 
 
AA- Aa1 AAA Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
AA- Aa1 AAA Development Bank of Japan 
AA- Aa1 AAA Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
A+ Aa1 - Japan Highway Public Corp 
 Aa3 - Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
  AA+ Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
  AA+ National Life Finance Corp 
  AA Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
  AA Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
  AA Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp 
  AA Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp for Private Schools 
  AA Social Welfare & Medical Service Corp  
  AA Water Resources Development Public Corp 
  AA- Corp for Advanced Transport & Technology 
  AA- Japan Scholarship Foundation 
  AA- New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
  A+ Urban Development Corp 
 
Sources: Moody's Japan (www.moodys.co.jp), Standard & Poor's 
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IISA Industrial Investment Special Account 
PLIF Postal Life Insurance Fund 
 
A box represents a sector or an institution involved in the FILP.  The arrows indicate the direction 
of the movement of funds, with solid lines indicating financial transactions and broken lines being 
fiscal transfers.  Numbers next to the lines refer to entries in Tables 1 and 2, which provide the yen 
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IISA Industrial Investment Special Account 
 
A box represents a sector or an institution involved in the FILP.The arrows indicate the direction of 
the movement of funds, with solid lines indicating financial transactions and broken lines being 
fiscal transfers.  The postal savings and the postal life insurance fund plan to buy bonds directly from 
local governments, because most of the local governments would have trouble floating their bonds 
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Figure 4. Yields of FILP Agency Bonds and Government Guaranteed Public Corporation 
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Appendix Table 1 
Total Financial losses of the FILP and Net Capital of FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen) 
 
  Losses resulting from: 
 Under- Over- 
Reserved Valued Policy Total Gross Net 
 Loans1 Assets2 Costs3 Losses4 Capital5 Capital6 Agency 
 
       Government Financial Institutions 
 1356.7 - -154.9 1201.8 -188.8 -1390.6 Government Housing Loan Corp 
 500.9 - 43.6 544.5 -180.1 -724.6 National Life Finance Corp 
 179.3 - 88.7 268.0 155.2 -112.8 Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
 149.5 - 499.0 648.5 244.8 -403.7 Agriculture Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
 5072.5 - 9.3 5081.8 1324.7 -3757.1 Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
 134.5 - 5.0 139.5 49.3 -90.2 Okinawa Development Finance Corp 
 273.3 - 128.2 401.5 1616.2 1214.7 Development Bank of Japan 
 281.2 - 723.1 1004.3 7338.2 6333.9 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
       Special Public Corporations 
 40.3 1199.4 1234.2 2473.9 417.4 -2056.5 Urban Development Corp 
 29.6 - 325.7 355.3 -819.8 -1175.1 Pension Welfare Service Public Corp 
 10.1 - - 10.1 1508.9 1498.8 Employment & Human Resources Development Org 
 0.0 165.2 36.5 201.7 -15.8 -217.5 Japan Environment Corp 
 - 43.1 -10.7 32.4 107.7 75.3 Teito Rapid Transit Authority 
 5.3 - 78.7 84.0 134.8 50.8 Japan Regional Development Corp 
 - 37.0 74.7 111.7 -7.4 -119.1 Japan Sewage Works Agency 
 16.2 - 69.6 85.8 297.8 212.0 Social Welfare & Medical Service Corp 
 5.4 - 4.9 10.3 3315.2 3304.9 Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp. for Private Schools of Japan 
 9.7 - 104.9 114.6 -77.8 -192.4 Japan Scholarship Foundation 
 0.1 - 1374.3 1374.4 686.1 -688.3 Japan Green Resources Corp 
 4.7 - - 4.7 107.4 102.7 Japan Intl Cooperation Agency 
 - 4445.1 3461.5 7906.6 6109.1 -1797.5 Japan Highway Public Corp 
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 - 475.6 270.9 746.5 187.1 -559.4 Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
 - 648.4 630.6 1279.0 -623.0 -1902.0 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
 0.0 2553.4 2.0 2555.4 -645.8 -3201.2 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 - 218.6 -62.0 156.6 282.9 126.3 New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
 6.7 - 3.3 10.0 962.8 952.8 Corp for Advanced Transport & Technology 
 - 464.0 235.4 699.4 42.3 -657.1 Water Resources Development Public Corp 
 4.2 - - 4.2 10.9 6.7 Fund for Promotion and Development of Amami Isles 
 1.5 - 0.6 2.1 25.5 23.4 Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
 100.2 - 1824.2 1924.4 1474.9 -449.5 Japan National Oil Corp 
 - - - - -3489.0 -3489.0 Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp 
 
       Special Firms 
 69.3 - 53.2 122.5 608.5 486.0 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 - - 2.2 2.2 419.1 416.9 Kansai International Airport Co Ltd 
 - - 1.3 1.3 26.3 25.0 Org for Promoting Urban Development 
 
 8,251.3 11,357.0 11,429.2a 31,037.4 - - Total 
 - - - - -6,047.5 -23,467.2 Total for negative capital 
 
 
1 Under-reserved bad loans are from Supplemental Table 3, column 1 minus column 3. An entry of 0.0 means the agency's non-performing loans 
were found by our analysis to be fully reserved. 
2 Over-valued assets are from Supplemental Table 4, column 2 minus column 3. 
3 Policy costs numbers are found in FILP Report 2001 Extension Volume: Policy cost Analysis of FILP Projects FY2001 and at 
www.mof.go.jp/english/zaito/zaito2001e-exv/exv-index.htm. 
4 Total losses are the sum of the first 3 columns. 
5 Gross capital is from the agency's Administrative Cost Statement where available, otherwise from its original balance sheet. These are reported on 
Supplemental Table 2. 
6 Net capital is gross capital minus total losses. 
a Composed of ¥11,656.8 in policy costs from 28 agencies and ¥227.6 in policy benefits from 3 agencies. 
Five special accounts and one special firm do not publish balance sheets regularly, so they are excluded from our analysis. These are noted on Supplemental 
Table 1 
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Appendix Table 2 
Government Capital and Public Funds Already Lost, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
Government capital Public loss of: 
 %1 Yen2 Original 
   capital3 Other4 Total Agency 
       Government Financial Institutions 
 100 166.2 166.2 * 1390.6 1578.8 Government Housing Loan Corp 
 100 321.9 321.9 * 724.6 1046.5 National Life Finance Corp 
 100 410.9 410.9 * 112.8 523.7 Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
 100 311.1 311.1 * 403.7 714.8 Agriculture Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
 100 16.6 16.6 * 3757.1 3773.7 Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
 100 63.2 63.2 * 90.2 153.4 Okinawa Development Finance Corp 
 100 1039.4 0  0 0 Development Bank of Japan 
 100 6986.2 652.3  0 652.3 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
       Special Public Corporations 
 99.3 683.0 683.0 * 2056.5 2739.5 Urban Development Corp 
 100 1075.4 1075.4 * 1175.1 2250.5 Pension Welfare Service Public Corp 
 100 2118.4 620.2  0 620.2 Employment & Human Resources Development Org 
 78.8 15.6 15.6 * 217.5 233.1 Japan Environment Corp 
 53.4 31.0 0  0 0 Teito Rapid Transit Authority 
 100 135.8 85.0  0 85.0 Japan Regional Development Corp 
 55.4 1.5 1.5 * 119.1 120.6 Japan Sewage Works Agency 
 100 292.6 80.6  0 80.6 Social Welfare & Medical Service Corp 
 100 723.1 371.9  0 371.9 Labor Welfare Corp 
 95.4 51.5 30.9  0 30.9 Org for Pharmaceutical Safety & Research 
 100 48.7 0  0 0 Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp. for Private Schools of Japan 
 100 3.7 3.7 * 192.4 196.1 Japan Scholarship Foundation 
 99.9 1257.7 110.2  0 110.2 Japan Small & Medium Enterprise Corp 
 100 675.9 675.9 * 688.3 1364.2 Japan Green Resources Corp 
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 92.8 70.3 49.6  0 49.6 Bio-oriented Technology Research Advancement Inst 
 100 1980.1 1980.1 * 1797.5 3777.6 Japan Highway Public Corp 
 50 298.5 298.5 * 483.6 782.1 Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp 
 50 235.1 235.1 * 559.4 794.5 Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
 67.5 516.9 516.9 * 1902.0 2418.9 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
 99.5 64.2 64.2 * 3201.2 3265.4 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 100 284.7 158.4  0 158.4 New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
 88.1 20.8 0  0 0 Corp for Advanced Transport & Technology 
 99.1 382.5 217.9  0 217.9 Telecommunications Advancement Org of Japan 
 100 2.4 2.4 * 657.1 659.5 Water Resources Development Public Corp 
 63.1 7.2 3.0  0 3.0 Fund for Promotion & Development of the Amami Isles 
 100 23.7 0.3  0 0.3 Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
 84.9 1636.8 1636.8 * 449.5 2086.3 Japan National Oil Corp 
 99.98 548.3 384.7  0 384.7 Japan Science & Technology Corp 
 96.9 319.9 265.9  0 265.9 Information-Technology Promotion Agency 
 94.5 305.6 252.2  0 252.2 Japan Key Technology Center 
 56.7 57.6 1.0  0 1.0 Industrial Structure Improvement Fund 
 72.4 9.5 0.2  0 0.2 New Energy & Industrial Technology Development 
 100 442.2 442.2 * 3489.0 3931.2 Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp 
 
       Special Firms 
 79.8 394.1 6.3  0 6.3 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 66.7 394.7 116.6  0 116.6 Kansai International Airport Co Ltd 
 
   12,380.4  23,467.2 35,847.6 Totals 
 
Not all institutions with government capital contributions are FILP agencies.  This table covers only FILP agencies. 
 
1 Government's percentage share of paid-in (contributed) capital.  
2 Amount of government contribution on the agency's balance sheet.  This includes any contributions through the Industrial Investment Special 
Account (IISA), which are included in the formal FILP plan, as well contributions directly from the general account and from other special accounts, 
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3 Government's loss of its original capital. If net capital (Appendix Table 1 column 6) is negative (as is the case for 20 agencies), all the 
government contribution to the corporation is considered lost. These cases are indicated by an *. 
If net capital is positive but smaller than the government contribution (as is the case for 20 agencies), the net loss is the government's share 
of net capital minus its contribution (column 4).  The government's share of net capital is column 1 (as a decimal) times Appendix Table 1 column 
6. In 7 cases, the government did not provide 100% of capital.  
4 Government's share of losses that exceed its original capital contribution. The assumption is that all loans to insolvent FILP recipients 
eventually will be taken over by the government (as has already happened for the former JNR), while non-governmental contributors of capital 
will lose no more than their original capital.  
For insolvent corporations (marked with *), the additional loss is the amount of negative net capital from Appendix Table 1 column 6. For 
solvent corporations, it is the amount by which the government's share of net capital is less than its contribution (column 4). The government's 













 Supplemental Table 1 
FILP Loans, Government-Guaranteed Bonds, and Total FILP Funds, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen) 
 
 TFB Postal Total GGB1 Total 
 Loans Life FILP  FILP Borrower  
  Loans Loans  Funds2 and number in category 
 
      Central Government 
 7,279 0 7,279 0 7,279 General Account (JNR loans)3 
 
      Special Accounts (SA) (10): 
 345 0 345 0 345 SA for National Hospital 
 671 0 671 0 671 SA for Lending Urban Development Funds 
 944 0 944 0 944 SA for Consolidation of Specific Natl Property * 
 1,037 0 1,037 0 1,037 SA for National Schools * 
 1,067 0 1,067 0 1,067 SA for Government-Operated Land Improvement Projects * 
 910 0 910 0 910 SA for National Forest Service 
 14 0 14 0 14 Road Improvement SA * 
 0 304 304 0 304 Postal Services SA 
 1,007 0 1,007 0 1,007 SA for Airport Development * 
 57,350 0 57,350 0 57,350 Postal Savings SA4 
 
      Government Financial Institutions (8): 
 73,348 1,401 74,749 602 75,351 Government Housing Loan Corp 
 8,071 2,066 10,137 100 10,237 National Life Finance Corp 
 2,674 2,722 5,397 1740 7,137 Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
 3,422 134 3,556 0 3,556 Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
 0 0 0 16,341 16,341 Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
 1,412 207 1,618 0 1,618 Okinawa Development Finance Corp 
 14,064 859 14,923 220 15,143 Development Bank of Japan 
 12,385 430 12,815 25 12,840 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
      Special Public Corps (SPCs) (27): 
 11,381 2,708 14,088 704 14,792 Urban Development Corp 
 35,967 0 35,967 0 35,967 Pension Welfare Service Public Corp 
 71 25 96 0 96 Employment and Human Resources Development Org 
 374 18 392 0 392 Japan Environment Corp 
 287 145 432 0 432 Teito Rapid Transit Authority 
  293 202 496 1 497 Japan Regional Development Corp 
 106 9 115 0 115 Japan Sewage Works Agency 
 2,699 0 2,699 40 2,739 Social Welfare and Medical Service Corp 
 27 0 27 0 27 Labor Welfare Corp 
 0 0 a2 0 2 Org for Pharmaceutical Safety & Research 
 202 114 316 0 316 Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp for Private Schools of Japan 
 661 0 661 0 661 Japan Scholarship Foundation 
 118 36 154 0 154 Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corp 
 475 0 475 0 475 Japan Green Resources Corp 
 0 0 a6 0 6 Bio-oriented Technology Research Advancement Inst 
 9,437 10,562 20,000 1,665 21,665 Japan Highway Public Corp 
 1,543 2,326 3,868 208 4,076 Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp 
 1,340 1,969 3,309 82 3,391 Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
 846 1,169 2,016 125 2,141 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
 926 161 1,087 471 1,558 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 112 230 342 0 342 New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
 2,925 119 3,044 524 3,568 Corp for Advanced Transport and Technology 
 1,012 306 1,318 50 1,368 Water Resources Development Public Corp 
 40 0 40 0 40 Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
 476 54 530 153 683 Japan National Oil Corp 
 0 0 a23 0 23 Japan Key Technology Center 
 0 15,472 15,472 0 15,472 Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp 
 
      Special Firms (11): 
 311 0 311 0 311 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 0 0 0 474 474 Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Corp * 
 0 0 0 5 5 Japan Airlines Co, Ltd 
 0 0 0 335 335 Kansai International Airport Co, Ltd 
 0 0 0 103 103 Central Japan International Airport Co, Ltd 
 4 11 15 47 62 East Japan Railway Co 
 5 14 18 0 18 Central Japan Railway Co 
 4 11 15 0 15 West Japan Railway Co 
 12 0 12 0 12 Japan Fright Railway Co 
 0 0 0 14 14 Org for Promoting Urban Development 
 924 223 1,147 551 1,698 Electric Power Development Co 
 
      Local Governments: 
 69,618 17,652 87,270 0 87,270 Local Governments 
 
  
 328,194 61,658 a389,883 24,579 414,462 Total, gross 
 270,844 61,658 a332,533 24,579 357,112 Total, net4 
 
* Do not publish balance sheets regularly, and so are excluded from analysis. 
 
1 GGB are government-guaranteed bonds. 
2 Figures here differ from the source because it includes ¥3,352 billion of capital contributed by the government through the IISA.  Here 
only loans are reported; government capital is in Appendix Table 1. 
3 TFB loans to the former Japan National Railroad (JNR) and former JNR Settlement Corp (JNRSC), which the government assumed. 
Unlike other loans to the general account, these are included in the formal FILP Plan. 
4 Funds the TFB has loaned back to the postal savings system for it to invest directly. These are excluded from the net total. 
a Includes Industrial Investment Special Account (IISA) loans.  These total ¥31 billion to 3 FILP agencies. 
 
Sources:  FILP Report 2001, p 42-43, and Zaisei Kin'yu Tokei Geppo (Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly), Jul 2001. 
 Supplemental Table 2 
Capital of FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
 Capital on: 
 Original Adminis- Capital 
 Balance trative Ratio 
 Sheet1 Statement2 (%)3 
    Central Government 
    Special Accounts: 
 1385.5 - 59.4 SA for National Hospital4 
 214.5 - 40.0 SA for Lending Urban Development Funds 
 7046.2 - 82.4 SA for Consolidation of Specific Natl Property 
 4497.2 - 51.1 Postal Savings SA4 
 
    Government Financial Institutions: 
 -174.6 -188.8 -0.2 Government Housing Loan Corp4 
 321.9 -180.1 -1.7 National Life Finance Corp 
 410.9 155.2 2.1 Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
 311.1 244.8 6.2 Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
 16.6 1324.7 5.3 Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
 64.8 49.3 2.8 Okinawa Development Finance Corp 
 1977.1 1616.2 8.6 Development Bank of Japan 
 7773.7 7338.2 31.7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
    Special Public Corps: 
 598.4 417.4 2.4 Urban Development Corp 
-1044.4 -819.8 -2.3 Pension Welfare Service Public Corp 
 1597.9 1508.9 63.9 Employment and Human Resources Development Org 
 19.8 -15.8 -4.0 Japan Environment Corp 
 107.7 - 8.3 Teito Rapid Transit Authority 
 147.6 134.8 18.0 Japan Regional Development Corp 
 -16.0 -7.4 -2.3 Japan Sewage Works Agency 
 303.4 297.8 9.6 Social Welfare and Medical Service Corp 
 551.2 351.2 62.3 Labor Welfare Corp 
 43.7 21.6 60.1 Org for Pharmaceutical Safety & Research 
-1540.4 3315.2 79.0 Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp. for Private Schools …5 
 8369.2 -77.8 -3.3 Japan Scholarship Foundation 
 1162.2 1148.8 11.9 Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corp 
 684.9 686.1 44.5 Japan Green Resources Corp 
 127.5 107.4 64.6 Japan Intl Cooperation Agency 
 46.5 75.7 69.8 Bio-oriented Technology Research Advancement Inst 
 2012.9 6109.1 18.2 Japan Highway Public Corp 
 597.6 994.8 16.9 Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp 
 470.2 187.1 4.7 Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
 -233.5 -623.0 -17.3 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
 233.7 -645.8 -6.3 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 279.6 282.9 32.2 New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
 970.2 962.8 12.3 Corp for Advanced Transport and Technology 
 178.8 166.9 83.9 Telecommunications Advancement Org of Japan 
 49.3 42.3 0.9 Water Resources Development Public Corp 
 10.9 10.9 27.7 Fund for Promotion & Development of the Amami Isles 
 26.9 25.5 34.2 Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
 1215.2 1474.9 36.6 Japan National Oil Corp 
  187.5 163.5 82.5 Japan Science & Technology Corp 
 239.8 55.7 66.0 Information-Technology Promotion Agency 
 290.1 47.8 66.8 Japan Key Technology Center 
 105.6 100.0 96.7 Industrial Structure Improvement Fund 
 282.2 12.8 77.8 New Energy & Industrial Technology Development 
 397.4 -3489.0 -14.3 Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp 
 
    Special Firms: 
 608.5 - 4.2 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 .. .. .. Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Corp6 * 
 267.7 - 14.9 Japan Airlines Co, Ltd * 
 419.1 - 26.2 Kansai International Airport Co, Ltd 
 32.6 - 18.2 Central Japan International Airport Co, Ltd * 
 952.6 - 13.1 East Japan Railway Co * 
 634.5 - 10.7 Central Japan Railway Co * 
 429.8 - 16.7 West Japan Railway Co * 
 41.8 - 13.5 Japan Fright Railway Co * 
 26.3 - 1.9 Org for Promoting Urban Development * 
 130.6 - 5.5 Electric Power Development Co 
 
 
The government's share of original capital is reported on Appendix Table 2. 
* None of the capital contributed directly by the government. 
1 Original balance sheets use accounting standards for public corporations. 
2 Administrative cost statements use standards for private sector firms. 
3 Ratio of capital to total assets reported on the administrative cost statement (or, for 
corporations that did not file administrative cost statements, the original balance sheet). 
4 Capital is adjusted by subtracting cumulative losses that are counted as assets. 
5 Promotion and Mutual Aid Corp for Private Schools of Japan. Because the corporation is not 
supposed to run a profit, on its original balance sheet it has added to reserves for future pension 
payments what would in the private sector be considered profit. On the administrative cost statement, 
this reserve (about ¥4.7 trillion) is reclassified as capital. 
6 Data are not available. 
 
Sources: Zaisei Kin'yu Tokei Geppo (Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly), Jul 2001 and the 




Supplemental Table 3 
Bad Loans of FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
 Bad Loans Loan Loss Reserve 
 in as % in as % of 
 yen1 total yen bad loans2 
     Government Financial Institutions: 
 1397.8 1.8 41.1 2.9 Government Housing Loan Corp 
 940.3 8.7 439.4 46.7 National Life Finance Corp 
 432.7 5.7 253.4 58.6 Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
 193.6 5.1 44.1 22.8 Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp 
 156.1 9.2 21.6 13.8 Okinawa Development Finance Corp 
 616.2 3.5 342.9 55.6 Development Bank of Japan 
 809.2 3.7 528.0 65.2 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
     Special Public Corps: 
 43.6 2.2 3.3 7.6 Urban Development Corp 
 44.8 0.5 15.2 33.9 Pension Welfare Service Public Corp 
 17.0 2.6 6.9 40.6 Employment and Human Resources Development Org 
 22.8* 6.2 33.0 144.7 Japan Environment Corp 
 10.5* 9.0 5.3 50.5 Japan Regional Development Corp 
 21.8 0.8 5.0 22.9 Social Welfare and Medical Service Corp 
 2.3 3.0 36.4 1582.6 Labor Welfare Corp 
 7.8 0.9 2.5 32.1 Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp for Private Schools of Japan 
 72.2 3.0 62.5 86.6 Japan Scholarship Foundation 
 131.9* 8.1 156.4 118.6 Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corp 
 0.5 23.8 0.4 80.0 Japan Green Resources Corp 
 5.2 67.6 0.5 9.6 Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 0.022 0.4 0.024 109.1 Bio-oriented Technology Research Advancement Inst 
 0.9 0.05 0.9 100.0 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 11.5 3.9 4.8 41.7 Corp for Advanced Transport and Technology 
 4.3 31.2 0.014 0.3 Fund for Promotion & Development of Amami Isles 
 1.7 9.4 0.2 11.8 Metal Mining Agency of Japan 
 120.2 43.9 20.0 16.6 Japan National Oil Corp 
 
     Special Firm: 
 533.9 4.9 464.6 87.0 Shoko Chukin Bank 
 
 
 5598.8 3.2 - - Total for all agencies 
 5440.9 - 2261.7 41.6 Total for under-reserved agencies 
 
 
FILP agencies not listed in this table do not have any loans to other corporations or do not disclose non-performing 
loans. 
1 For the government financial institutions and Shoko Chukin Bank, entries are for risk-management loans.  SPCs 
are allowed to use a less strict definition. For them, the figures show amounts of loans past-due 6 months or more 
or loans to bankrupt entities that they report with their balance sheets. 
2 An entry under 100% means the agency is under-reserved. The absolute amount is given in Appendix Table 1. 
Only 5 of the 26 agencies listed have reserves equal to or in excess of their bad loans. 
* The administrative cost statements of Japan Environment Corp, Japan Regional Development Corp, and Japan 
Small and Medium Enterprise Corp do not have any reference to non-performing loans. However, their original 
financial statements do, so data are taken from there. 
 
Sources: Administrative cost statements of the agencies, except as noted by *. 
 
 
Supplemental Table 4 
Over-Valuation of Business Assets held by FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001 
(billion yen and percents) 
 
  Asset Values: 
 - - - Over  
 Origi- ACS2 As re- valua- 
 nal1  valued tion (%)3 
 
 16,959 16,624 15,425 7.8 Urban Development Corp 
 257 252 87 189.9 Japan Environment Corp 
 1,232 - 1,189 3.6 Teito Rapid Transit Authority 
 151 162 125 29.6 Japan Sewage Works Agency 
 38,532 32,808 28,363 15.7 Japan Highway Public Corp 
 6,754 5,827 4,720 23.5 Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp 
 4,790 3,954 3,478 13.7 Hanshin Expressway Public Corp 
 3,946 3,538 2,890 22.4 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
 5,362 5,335 2,782 91.8 Japan Railway Construction Public Corp 
 824 825 606 36.1 New Tokyo International Airport Authority 
 3,638 3,638 3,174 14.6 Water Resources Development Public Corp 
 2,215 - 2,478 -10.6 Electric Power Development Co 
 
 
Only agencies reporting significant physical assets have been revalued.  We are unable to 
revalue two agencies (Japan Regional Development Corporation and Japan Green Resources 
Corporation) because changes in accounting rules in 1986 prevent a consistent time series. 
 
1 Asset values reported in original balance sheets. 
2 Asset values reported in administrative cost statements. 
3 Difference between revalued assets and amount reported in the administrative cost 
statement as a percentage of the revalued assets, except for Teito Rapid Transit Authority and 
Electric Power Development Company. They are believed to have been publishing balance 
sheets comparable to those of private sector companies, and hence are not required to file 
administrative cost statements. Therefore, their original balance sheets are used. Absolute 
amounts are in Appendix Table 1 column 2. 
 
Source: Authors' calculation based on the data published in Zaisei Kin'yu Tokei Geppo 
(Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly), various issues, and the administrative cost statement of 
each agency.  Supplemental Appendix A describes the revaluation method in detail and 
discusses the depreciation rates and land price series used for each corporation.  It is available 
elsewhere on this web site. 
 
 Supplemental Table 5 
Secondary Market Yield Spreads on FILP Agency Bonds (Percents) 
 Date 
















National Life Finance Corporation 0.181        
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Co. 1 (3/20/07) 0.476 0.525 0.500 0.257     
Japan Finance Co. for Municipal Enterprises 1 (12/26/11) 0.148 0.154 0.172 0.120     
Development Bank of Japan 1 (9/20/06) 0.124 0.133 0.155 0.132 0.118 0.122 0.157 0.133 
Development Bank of Japan 2 (3/20/07) 0.132 0.130 0.149 0.110     
Development Bank of Japan 3 (6/20/07) 0.121 0.125       
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 1 (9/20/06) 0.116 0.128 0.171 0.118 0.081 0.095 0.083 0.101 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 2 (9/20/11) 0.132 0.141 0.166 0.115 0.109 0.104 0.098 0.103 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 3 (3/20/07) 0.119 0.114       
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 4 (3/20/12) 0.138 0.141       
Urban Development Corporation 1 (3/18/05) 0.777 0.817 0.786      
Japan Regional Development Corporation 1 (3/28/05) 0.818 0.814 0.803      
Social Welfare & Medical Service Corp. 1 (2/18/05) 0.557 0.583 0.506 0.305     
Promotion Corp. for Private Schools 1 (11/21/11) 0.629 0.582 0.535 0.273 0.226 0.205 0.202  
Japan Scholarship Foundation 1 (12/5/11) 0.689 0.592 0.543 0.289 0.258 0.244   
Japan Highway Public Corporation 1 (3/20/07) 0.686 0.721 0.593 0.391     
Japan Highway Public Corporation 2 (12/20/11) 0.740 0.747 0.688 0.439     
Japan Highway Public Corporation 3 (6/20/07) 0.727 0.798       
Japan Highway Public Corporation 4 (3/20/12) 0.791 0.845       
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation 1 (6/20/07) 0.778        
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation 2 (3/20/12) 0.812        
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation 1 (3/20/07) 0.728 0.732 0.647 0.548     
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation 2 (12/20/11) 0.773 0.783 0.741 0.570     
Japan Railway Construction Pub. Corp. 1 (12/20/11) 0.689 0.639 0.666 0.333 0.222 0.207   
New Tokyo Int’l Airport Authority 1 (9/22/11) 0.686 0.662 0.614 0.387 0.329 0.317 0.306 0.316 
New Tokyo Int’l Airport Authority 2 (12/13/11) 0.717 0.663 0.600 0.389 0.337 0.325   
Corp. for Adv’d Transport & Tech. 1 (12/20/05) 0.594 0.568 0.479 0.264 0.217 0.220 0.205  
Water Resource Development Corp. 1 (9/20/11) 0.666 0.615 0.566 0.271 0.200 0.203   
 
Source: Japan Securities Dealers Association, Koshasai Kijun Kehai (Member Quotation of Bond Prices) (http://www.jsda.or.jp). 
Notes: The date at the top of each column shows the date when the quotations were published.  The spread is the difference between the compound yields 
of the bond and a long-term JGB (Japanese Government Bonds) with a comparable maturity.  When there are more than one JGBs with the same maturity, 
the yield was calculated as the simple average of their compound yields.  When we cannot find any long-term JGB that matures within a month before or after 
the FILP agency bond matures, we took the weighted average of the yields of bonds with two closest maturing dates. 
 
 
Supplemental Appendix A for Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshi “Paying for the FILP”: 
Reevaluation of business assets held by public corporations 
September 1, 2002 
 
 This appendix documents our construction of the market value of business assets for each 
public corporation.  We start out by dividing the amount of business assets (and the construction 
in progress) reported on the book into land (which does not depreciate) and other assets (which 
do depreciate).  We need to know both how much of the business assets at the beginning of 
calculation (fiscal 1965 in our case) was land and how much of the new investment in each year 
has been in land.  For the agencies that predominantly engage in construction projects, the 
information is obtained from Kensetsu Gyomu Tokei Nenpo (Statistical Yearbook of Construction 
Business) published by the Ministry of Construction (MOC).    Some corporations, although the 
information is not found in the MOC publication, distinguish between land and the other 
business assets in their administrative cost statements.  For such a case, we set the proportion of 
land business asset so that the ratio of the land to the other business assets as of the end of fiscal 
2000 that we estimate is equal to the ratio of the land to the other business assets reported in the 
administrative cost statement.  For two corporations (Japan Environment Corporation and 
Electric Power Development Company), we have not been able to find any information about the 
proportion of land in their assets.  Thus, we assumed it to be constant over time at 20%.  Table 
A.1 (second column) summarizes the data source for the proportion of land assets that we used 
for each public corporation.  “MOC” denotes the information on the land intensity of the 
agency’s assets is taken from the MOF publication.  “ACS” denotes the land intensity figures 
were estimated backward from the ratio reported in the administrative cost statement for fiscal 
2000.   
 
 Let At be the book value of all business assets at the beginning of period t, Jt be the book 
value of construction in progress at the beginning of period t, and Dt be the depreciation of 
business assets during the period t reported in the book.  All of these are readily available in the 
financial statements that each public corporation publishes.  Let a be the proportion of land in 
the all business assets.  We estimate the investment in land during the period t as: 
(A.1) { })()( 11 ttttt JAJAIL +-+= ++a  
Similarly, the investment in the business assets other than land is estimated as: 
(A.2) { } tttttt DJAJAIK ++-+-= ++ )()()1( 11a  
We assume all the depreciation reported on the book is allocated to non-land business assets, 
assuming the corporation does not let the land depreciate.  Note that the investments calculated 
using (A.1) and (A.2) can be either positive or negative.  Negative investments would imply (net) 
depletion or sales of the assets. 
 
 We assume that the book value of the business assets (including the construction in 
progress) was equal to its market value at the end of fiscal 1965 (beginning of fiscal 1966).  Let 
XLt and XKt be the market value of land and the business assets other than land in place 
respectively at the beginning of period t (including the construction in progress).  Then our 
assumptions are: 
 
(A.3) )( 196619661966 JAXL += a  
(A.4) ))(1( 196619661966 JAXK +-= a  
 
If the corporation was established after 1966, the above equalities are assumed to hold at the end 
of its first accounting year. 
 
 Letting plt be the land price and pkt be the price of the other business assets respectively at 
the beginning of period t, and d be the economic depreciation rate of the (non-land) business 
assets, we can calculate the market values of the land and the other business assets for the 
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The market value of total business assets at the beginning of period t is calculated by summing 
up XLt and XKt. 
 
 The economic depreciation rates for the non-land assets held by public corporations are 
taken from Economic Planning Agency (1998).  The depreciation rates used for each corporation 
are reported in the last column of Table A.1.  For the price of business assets other than land, the 
deflator for the public investment reported in the national income accounts was used.  Land price 
indices compiled by the Japan Real Estate Research Institute were used for the land price.  Table 
A.2 lists the land price series that we used for each public corporation. 
 
 
Table A.1. Assumptions on Business Assets and Depreciations for Public Corporations 
 












Urban Development Corporation    
     Account for Urban Development MOC 45 5.0 
     Account for Railroads MOC 26 8.5 
Japan Environment Corporation 20% 15 14.2 
Teito Rapid Transit Authority ACS 34 6.5 
Japan Sewage Works Agency ACS 15 14.2 
Japan Highway Public Corporation MOC 47 4.5 
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp. MOC 47 4.5 
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation MOC 47 4.5 
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority MOC 45 5.0 
Japan Railway Construction Public Corp. ACS 26 8.5 
New Tokyo International Airport Authority ACS 17 12.7 
Water Resources Development Public Corp. MOC 49 4.6 
Electric Power Development Company 20% 26 8.3 
 
Source: Ministry of Construction, Kensetsu Gyomu Tokei Nenpo (Statistical Yearbook of Construction 
Business), various issues, and Tokushu Hojin Soran (Handbook of Special Public Corporations), various 
issues. 
 
Notes: “MOC” denotes the information on the land intensity of the agency’s assets is taken from the MOF 
publication.  Because the data are not yet available for fiscal 1999 and 2000, the simple average of the 
land intensity for fiscal 1994-1998 was used for fiscal 1999 and 2000.  “ACS” denotes the land intensity 
figures were estimated backward from the ratio reported in the administrative cost statement for fiscal 
2000. 
Life of the non-land business assets for each corporation was calculated as the weighted average 
of the lifetimes for the components of the assets.  The figures for each type of assets were taken from 
Economic Planning Agency (1998) and as follows: road (47 years), airport (17 years), assets held by 
Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation (26 years), subway (34 years), sewage (15 years), waste 
disposal facilities (15 years), flood control facilities (49 years), and assets held by Electric Power 
Development Company (26 years).   
The depreciation rate for each corporation is calculated so that the scrap value of the assets at the 
end of their life is 10% (the scrap value of assets specified in the Japanese tax code) of the original value. 
We tried to include all public corporations whose business assets mostly consist of physical 
capitals.  We were not able to reevaluate the assets of Japan Regional Development Corporation and 
Japan Green Resources Corporation, because the change in the accounting rule in 1986 made it 
impossible for us to come up with consistent time series. 
 
Table A.2. Land Price Series 
 
Agency Land Price Series Used 
Urban Development Corporation  
     Account for Urban Development JREI (6 largest cities, residential use) 
     Account for Railroads OPLP (Tokyo metropolitan, residential use) 
Japan Environment Corporation JREI (all urban areas, industrial use) 
Teito Rapid Transit Authority OPLP (Tokyo metropolitan, semi-industrial use) 
Japan Sewage Works Agency JREI (all urban areas, residential use) 
Japan Highway Public Corporation JREI (all urban areas, all uses) 
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation OPLP (Tokyo metropolitan, semi-industrial use) 
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation OPLP (Osaka metropolitan, semi-industrial use) 
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority JREI (outside 6 largest cities, residential use) 
Japan Railway Construction Public Corp. JREI (all urban areas, all uses) 
New Tokyo International Airport Authority OPLP (Tokyo metropolitan, semi-industrial use) 
Water Resources Development Public Corp. JREI (all urban areas, industrial use) 
Electric Power Development Company JREI (all urban areas, industrial use) 
 
Notes: JREI denotes a series taken from Index of Urban Land Prices by the Japan Real Estate Institute.  
OPLP denotes a series taken from Koji Chika (Officially Published Land Prices) by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport.  OPLP is not available for the period before 1969.  We extended the OPLP 
series back to fiscal 1965 by splicing the JREI indexes for 6 largest cities. 
 
 
